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ABSTRACT 
In view of the market failures and the state failures inherent in providing agricultural extension, 
community-based approaches, which involve farmers‘ groups, have gained increasing importance in 
recent years as a ―third way‖ to provide this service. The paper discusses the conceptual underpinnings of 
community-based extension approaches, highlights theoretical and practical challenges inherent in their 
design, and assesses the evidence available so far on their performance. The paper reviews both 
quantitative and qualitative studies, focusing on three examples that contain important elements of 
community-based extension: the National Agricultural Advisory Services program of Uganda, the 
agricultural technology management agency model of India, and the farmer field school approach. The 
review finds that in the rather few cases where performance has been relatively carefully studied, elite 
capture was identified as a major constraint. Other challenges that empirical studies found include a 
limited availability of competent service providers, deep-seated cultural attitudes that prevent an effective 
empowerment of farmers, and difficulties in implementing farmers‘ control of service providers‘ 
contracts. The paper concludes that, just as for the state and the market, communities can also fail in 
extension delivery. Hence, the challenge for innovative approaches in agricultural extension is to identify 
systems that use the potential of the state, the market, and communities to create checks and balances to 
overcome the failures inherent in all of them. 
Keywords: agricultural extension, community-based development 
  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Economists have often neglected the role of the community as a third pillar in the economic system next 
to the state and the market. Yet in agricultural development, which often is thwarted by both market and 
state failures, the ―community mechanism‖ has a particular and promising role to play. It is one of Yujiro 
Hayami‘s unique contributions to the economics literature that he developed ―a conceptual framework for 
economists‖ that emphasizes the role of communities and shows how the contested concept of social 
capital can be applied to analyze communities from an economic perspective (Hayami 2009).  At the 
same time, Hayami is not a ―community romanticist‖—he is well aware that, just as states and markets, 
communities can also fail to provide public goods efficiently and equitably.  
Hayami‘s insights on the community mechanism are particularly important for agricultural 
extension, which plays a leading role among the public services through which governments have 
traditionally sought to promote agricultural performance. Governments employ hundreds of thousands of 
public (or publicly paid) extension agents in developed and developing countries. International 
development agencies have provided in the past five decades several billions of dollars in programs to 
support and upgrade extension services in developing countries. Yet development scholars and 
practitioners have generally concluded that the performance of extension services in developing countries 
has been disappointing. A 2001 review sponsored by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), for example, characterized extension services across the developing world as ―failing,‖ 
―moribund,‖ and in ―disarray or barely functioning at all‖ (Rivera, Qamar, and Crowder, 2001, 15).  
Many agricultural development scholars attribute the inadequate performance of public extension 
to ineffective incentives for extension agents. In most public systems, agents are nominally accountable to 
their superiors (who may not be attentive to effective supervision) and are only indirectly (if at all) 
accountable to their farmer-clients. Moreover, the lack of information and feedback on different farmers‘ 
groups‘ needs and priorities hinders the design of relevant and effective extension programs (Anderson 
and Feder 2007). 
In view of such realities, many extension scholars and development practitioners have focused on 
assessing the merits and feasibility of demand-driven approaches to extension (Kidd et al. 2000; Rivera 
and Zijp 2002; Chapman and Tripp 2003; Rivera and Alex 2005; Birner et al. 2006; Chipeta 2006; 
Anderson 2007; Birner and Anderson 2007). In economic theory, the term demand refers to the amount of 
good or service that a consumer is willing and able to buy at a given price. In principle, the market 
mechanism would make agricultural extension demand driven, but as discussed further in Section 2, 
agricultural extension is characterized by various market failures (Table 1). Therefore, other approaches 
are needed to make extension demand driven. This paper focuses on the community-based extension 
(CBE) approach as a strategy to reach this goal. Hence the terms demand driven and community based are 
used interchangeably here. In their purest form, in such extension approaches the providers of service are 
contracted directly by farmers‘ groups or communities to deliver information and related services that are 
specified by farmers. There are various ways of financing such systems (Katz 2002), but in actual practice 
the funds to finance the contracts can be provided in part or in full by governments. Yet, the contracts are 
issued and monitored by the community of clients. Ideally, decisions about contract renewal are made by 
the community as well, based on its satisfaction with the quality of services rendered in the past. Such a 
modus operandi is expected to provide agents with stronger incentives to provide quality advice. 
Furthermore, the design ensures that information and other services are in line with farmers‘ needs and 
priorities. Several variants of such CBE approaches have been implemented in the past 15 years, mostly 
with public funding of the extension providers‘ costs (Keynan, Olin, and Dinar 1977; Kidd et al. 2000; 
Dinar and Keynan 2001; Chapman and Tripp 2003; Hanson, Just, and Lainez 2006; Anderson and Feder 
2007; Birner and Anderson 2007).  
In this paper, we apply Hayami‘s insights on the community mechanism to discuss in some detail 
the conceptual underpinnings of CBE approaches, highlight theoretical and practical challenges inherent 
in their design, and assess the evidence available so far on their actual performance. Accordingly, the next 2 
section describes features of agricultural extension relevant to understanding system performance. The 
subsequent section outlines approaches to meeting the challenges through community-based, demand-
driven systems. We then review some real-world experiences with such systems, and conclude with a 
summary of the insights gained and their implications for development policy. 
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2.  MARKET AND STATE FAILURE IN AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION  
The literature on agricultural extension highlights a number of market failures that provide justification 
for some form of collective action to ameliorate those shortcomings. Birner and Anderson (2007) review 
several types of extension-related market failures, which are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Types of market failure in agricultural extension 
Reason for 
Market Failure  Explanation 
Public good  Information delivery, a key task of extension, often has public-good characteristics, as the 
information may not entail excludability and rivalry. 
Merit good 
Extension services can be a merit good, which implies that the clients undervalue the benefits 
due to insufficient information or an overly short planning horizon (a characteristic of poorer 
farmers). 
Externalities  Extension activities may carry externalities in that their impact serves national, possibly 
noneconomic, objectives (such as food security or environmental goals).   
Transaction costs  The provision of information to large numbers of spatially dispersed and imperfectly 
organized smallholders entails economies of scale due to high transaction costs. 
Source: Based on Birner and Anderson (2007). 
Such failures explain the practically universal involvement of national or lower-level 
governments with extension services, although the involvement does not necessarily require the provision 
of service through the staff of a public-sector organization. The disenchantment with direct service 
provision by the public sector to which we alluded in the introduction stems from a number of attributes 
that are frequently inherent in the way public extension systems are organized and managed. Feder, 
Willett, and Zijp (2001) and Birner and Anderson (2007) provide an extensive discussion of the (often 
interrelated) attributes leading to state failure in agricultural extension. We summarize them as follows:  
(i)  Scale and complexity. The cost of reaching large numbers of geographically dispersed, 
remote, and often not highly literate smallholder farmers who have limited access to mass 
media is high in many parts of the developing world. The problem is aggravated by the fact 
that farming systems are often complex (having several types of crops and livestock) and 
entail variation in soils, slope and micro-climate. Budgetary and practical considerations 
compel extension agents to interact directly with only a fraction of their clientele. It is often 
the larger-scale, better-resourced, and more innovative farmers who get the attention of 
extension agents, because they are more likely to provide small rewards to the agents, or 
because they can readily follow the advice given, even if it requires acquisition of purchased 
inputs (for example, fertilizers). Such concentration on a nonrepresentative portion of the 
clientele naturally reduces the potential for farmer-to-farmer diffusion, which in turn reduces 
the benefits and impact of extension (cf. Pritchett and Woolcock 2004).  
(ii)  Dependence on broader policy environment. Just as with other agricultural programs, 
the impact of extension activities depends not only on the design of the specific program or 
service delivered but also on other policies and investments where the decisionmakers are 
exogenous to the extension system (for example, price policies, input supply systems, rural 
credit, transport infrastructure). Extension‘s impact may be more adversely affected by this 
dependence if the feedback (regarding relevance and implementability) to the designers of 
key information and advice content is deficient, either because the feedback comes from 
nonrepresentative farmers (due to issues raised in item i) or because the incentives of agents 
to provide detailed feedback are compromised (discussed later in this list).  4 
(iii)  Interaction with knowledge generation. In most countries, agricultural research 
organizations and agricultural extension organizations are managed as separate entities. 
Coordination and two-way feedback flows have often been deficient (Mureithi and Anderson 
2004). The incentive structure in research organizations seldom links researchers‘ payoff 
directly to the performance of farmers, and thus the prioritization of research agendas (on 
which extension management usually has limited influence) does not always closely reflect 
farmers‘ priorities. Consequently, extension agents may not have the knowhow to advise 
farmers on some specific issues that significantly affect agricultural performance.  
(iv) Public duties other than knowledge transfer. Extension workers are mostly civil 
servants (whether they are local government or national government employees), and they 
often constitute the most extensive field-level cadres that governments have. Governments 
therefore are tempted to use extension staff for other (nonextension) duties, whether as 
routine additional assignments or as ad hoc tasks (such as collection of agricultural statistics, 
distribution of subsidized inputs, rural health and family planning programs, and election 
campaign work on behalf of local or national ruling parties). Furthermore, some of the 
nonextension tasks provide opportunities for monetary gains through corruption (for example, 
the distribution of rationed inputs), and agents may have incentives to focus on these.  
(v)  Difficulty in attributing impact. Farmers are better placed to assess the quality and 
impact of agents‘ work than extension supervisors. The latter cannot easily determine the 
contribution of agents‘ efforts to agricultural performance, because it is affected by a 
multitude of exogenous factors as well as farmers‘ circumstances, making it difficult to assess 
what contribution has been made by extension services to the actual outcomes on farmers‘ 
fields and to farmers‘ incomes. Moreover, the incentives to deliver high-quality monitoring 
information are typically weak (Martens et al. 2002, 20).  
(vi) Weak accountability to farmers. Most public extension entities are organized as 
hierarchical public services, where employees are accountable to their superiors, and the 
ultimate accountability of the organization‘s leadership is to local (county, province) or 
national political authorities. In smallholder-dominated developing countries, farmers are 
often not sufficiently organized as a political constituency to be able to exert influence on 
extension management. Even when farmers are organized in national or large regional 
associations, they are often dominated by larger-scale and wealthier farmers, so that even 
where farmers can influence the content of extension programs, such content may reflect the 
priorities and interests of limited and better-off groups, rather than those of the numerically 
larger but poorer farm classes.  
(vii)  Bureaucratic procedures. As in many government organizations, bureaucratic 
management and personnel procedures make it difficult for extension agents to respond 
flexibly to local demands, especially in highly centralized systems. Encouraging processes of 
institutional learning and change is a major challenge in public-sector agencies. Likewise, 
bureaucratic structures often discourage the coordination of agricultural extension with other 
departments. As pointed out previously, even links to the agricultural research system are 
often weak in spite of their obvious importance.  
(viii)  Weak incentives to perform. Because supervisors have difficulty attributing impact at 
the farm level to the effort of individual agents, and because agents are typically not 
accountable to the farmers (who are actually the best judges of extension agents‘ relevance 
and effectiveness), agents are not strongly motivated to exert themselves. This is reflected 
variously in a limited effort to interact with farmers in the field, little willingness to learn 
from farmers‘ experience, low-quality and generic advice offered, and weak incentives to 
invest in updating one‘s knowledge or to acquire skills for effective dissemination of 5 
knowledge. At higher management levels, there are no incentives to create mechanisms (for 
example, participatory processes) for fostering accountability to the grassroots clients who 
can best observe the quality and quantity of extension input, or to give farmers a say in the 
prioritizing of extension programs.  
(ix)  Weak political commitment and support. Because even in the aggregate it is difficult 
to attribute agricultural performance to extension efforts, and because extension activities are 
not as visible as other rural investments such as irrigation or road projects, politicians may 
perceive a lower (political) payoff to extension expenditures. Thus, in a context of limited 
fiscal resources, decisionmakers tend to assign low priority to extension. This situation will 
be exacerbated by (often justified) perceptions of poor performance of the system as a whole, 
which emanates from the incentive problems outlined previously. Sporadic expansions of 
extension systems that are spurred by external donor-funded programs tend to be short-lived 
because, once the external funding is exhausted, there is no domestic political support for the 
higher levels of funding (Anderson, Feder, and Ganguly 2006).  
Over the years, extension scholars and practitioners have recognized the preceding weaknesses 
and issues, and they have proposed and introduced various reforming fixes and modifications to address 
them (Feder, Willett, and Zijp 2001). Among the fixes, CBE is perceived by many observers as a 
particularly important strategy because it promises to overcome both the state failures and the market 
failures inherent in extension (see World Bank 1996; Rivera and Zijp 2002; World Bank 2005b).  
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3.  COMMUNITY-BASED EXTENSION IN THEORY  
This section discusses the potential and the challenges of CBE to overcome the problems that plague 
state-managed extension systems. The discussion mainly draws on collective action theory and the 
concept of social capital. We begin with an overview of different forms of CBE. 
Levels of Community Participation 
As indicated in the introduction, in the purest form of CBE, the extension service is contracted by the 
community or is part of the staff of a farmers‘ association. In a more diluted format, of community 
extension, farmers‘ organizations, whether representing single communities or wider constituencies, have 
a say in the design and execution of extension programs. The latter approach can improve the extension 
service received by farmers and may provide advantages to smallholders. In most developing countries, 
the farmers-to-agent ratio is more than 1,000:1 (see Anderson and Feder 2004). Hence, farmers have a 
hard time exercising demand and holding service providers accountable without some form of 
organization. Farmers‘ associations can play an important role in aggregating farmers‘ demands for 
extension and in representing farmers in participatory models of extension management so as to make 
extension more demand driven. As Figure 1 illustrates, farmers‘ associations can exercise demand in 
different stages of the agricultural extension delivery chain. 
Figure 1. Participation of farmers’ associations in different stages of the extension delivery chain 
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Source: Authors, adapted from World Bank and IFPRI (2010, Figure 2.2). 
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Advantages of Community-Based Extension 
One advantage of a CBE system is that it can benefit from the social capital of rural communities and 
farmers‘ organizations. Hayami (2009, 98) defined social capital as the ―structure of the informal social 
relationships conducive to developing cooperation among economic actors aimed at increasing social 
product, which is expected to accrue to the group of people embedded in those social relationships.‖ 
Moreover, farmers‘ organizations can help reduce the transaction costs of providing extension, as in 
group-based extension approaches, thus relieving some of the problems emanating from the scale and 
complexity of traditional extension systems (issue i in Section 2). Another advantage of CBE is that 
providers of extension advice are, in principle, directly accountable to the farmers who are members of 
the community or the organization. An effective role in the contracting of service providers and in the 
assessment of their performance is crucial in creating such accountability (issue vi in Section 2). Thus, 
when designed properly, CBE can overcome the critical issue afflicting traditional top-down extension 
systems—namely, weak incentive to perform to the satisfaction of farmers (issue vi in Section 2). The 
difficulties of monitoring and attributing impact and assessing relevance are also less acute, as the 
services are focused on issues reflecting farmers‘ demand, and farmers are involved in providing 
feedback or even in assessing the service (issue v in Section 2). The prospects for garnering political 
support are also better (and the derived budgetary support and financial sustainability): a more effective 
service with attributable impacts can produce political payoffs for local and national politicians (issue ix 
in Section 2). Moreover, in CBE the public-good aspect of extension is defined at a local or community 
level, and this may enable some cost recovery, as the free rider problem (see Section 3.3) is easier to 
resolve. However, several issues, some specific to CBE and some typical of extension systems, may 
hamper the effectiveness of CBE, and it is to those that we now turn.  
Challenges of Community-Based Extension 
A major challenge for CBE is the classical problem of collective action (Olson 1965): if the benefits of 
extension advice are nonexcludable, farmers have limited incentives to incur the transaction costs of 
participating in the organizational activities that are related to the establishment and management of the 
organization (the free rider problem). The incentives to join local farmers‘ groups for the purpose of 
group-based extension may be rather strong, because the participants expect to benefit directly from their 
participation, and the already high social capital is reinforced. However, to participate in extension 
planning and management beyond the local level, farmers need to become organized at a more aggregate 
level, which poses its own challenges. The literature on the role of group size and heterogeneity in 
collective action is extensive, and the relations continue to be debated (Poteete and Ostrom 2004). Often, 
farmers have social capital that has been generated in the context of their small community and that 
would facilitate group activities and induce leaders and members to exert unpaid efforts on behalf of the 
group. But that capital may not exist across communities (Hayami 2009). That is, to the extent that CBE 
requires organization and collective action across communities, the incentives may not suffice. Donor-
sponsored CBE programs often tackle this problem by financing the organization of cross-community 
farmer entities and compensating farmer leaders and representatives for the time and effort they invest in 
such collective activities. However, it is a common phenomenon that organizations formed for donor-
funded projects collapse once project funding ends (for example, Ameur 1994; Purcell and Anderson 
1997 for the case of extension). As Hayami (2009, 115) points out, ―The hasty expansion of community-
driven participatory development projects by external aid agencies, along (sic) the current vogue of social 
capital and community participation in the absence of real understandings of local economic and social 
systems, has resulted in a serious waste of development resources.‖  
There is another issue that many participatory development programs encounter, one that is likely 
to affect CBE programs that depend to some extent on public-sector implementation mechanisms. The 
problem arises from the entrenched, top-down, patronizing attitudes that often characterize all levels of 
governments that deal with small- and medium-scale farmers. Thus, even when CBE concepts and 
participatory operational modalities are championed by influential policymakers (possibly encouraged 8 
and fortified by the financial and intellectual support of external donors), resistance may occur at various 
levels of the relevant bureaucracies. Resistance may reflect itself in attempts to dilute participatory 
bodies‘ powers, foot-dragging on budget transfers, and co-option of farmer leaders to support the interests 
of the bureaucracy rather than those of the community. Training of various levels of government in 
participatory concepts is a solution often adopted by champions of CBE, but it may not suffice to resolve 
the problem, as pointed out by Braun et al. (2006, 35): ―given that farmers, and especially women, have 
very little political influence in most developing countries, such efforts to move towards participation [in 
extension systems] often flounder on bureaucratic procedures, hierarchical structures, political exigencies, 
budget constraints, etc.‖ 
Consistent with Hayami‘s (2009) analysis of the community mechanism, CBE systems are not 
equally suited for all kinds of extension. They have particular comparative advantages to facilitate 
extension for activities that require collective action, such as many types of natural resource management 
and pest management. Where farms are diverse in enterprise mix and where more farm-specific advice is 
required, the comparative advantage of CBE approaches is lower. Thus, different farming systems require 
different types of extension systems. 
Another major challenge to CBE is avoiding social exclusion and elite capture—both of which 
are common problems in rural development programs and in extension specifically. Rural communities 
and farmers‘ organizations are often dominated by middle-class and relatively wealthy farmers. Poor 
farmers and socially marginalized groups typically play a limited role in the leadership of communities 
and rural organizations, even if they are members. In particular, the representation of women is often low, 
a problem linked to the sociocultural role of women in many societies as well as to the time constraints 
faced by women (see Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen 1998; Quisumbing 2003). One strategy to deal with 
the elite capture and the social exclusion problems is the formation of specialized organizations, such as 
groups exclusively for women farmers, or the allocation of reserved seats for women and disadvantaged 
groups in participatory planning and management boards.  
The concept of CBE presumes that sufficient numbers of would-be qualified advisory 
professionals (or organizations containing such professionals) are available to do the needful work 
(Chapman and Tripp 2003, 7). Often, the expectation is that the existing public extension service cadres 
would form the core of such an industry, either as part of a semi-autonomous public (or privatized) entity 
that can be contracted, or as individual professionals following a privatization of the extension service. 
The nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) dealing with rural development services in some countries 
are also viewed as potential extension service providers. The designers of CBE projects commonly pay 
attention to the issue of accrediting and regulating service providers. However, in countries with endemic 
governance deficiencies, the process of accreditation may be corrupted. The background and training of 
the pool of potential service providers (including the existing public extension personnel) may not suffice 
to address the more specific and localized issues that are likely to be brought up in a demand-driven 
system. Large-scale training (at public expense, at least initially) may be required (Chapman and Tripp 
2003).  
Community organizations are not immune to mismanaging funds. When an organization deals 
with various farmers‘ agendas rather than exclusively with extension, agricultural extension may not 
necessarily be a priority for the leadership of the organization. Lobbying for state support in the form of 
subsidies is often a higher priority than helping the members become more competitive. On the other 
hand, integrating extension into an existing entity that was founded for a broader set of goals is an 
important strategy to reduce the transaction costs of collective action. Elite capture of a different type 
occurs when leaders of large organizations may have incentives to run for political office, which in turn 
could lead to conflicts of interest. As noted, politicians have also been known to misuse public extension 
systems for their own purposes. Private provision of extension dodges most such political capture 
problems but fails to serve many impoverished groups adequately. So, CBE approaches, although not risk 
free, may present the most attractive options for extension provision in many situations. Accordingly, the 
important matter of performance in practice should be turned to, as in the section that follows.  9 
4.  COMMUNITY-BASED EXTENSION IN PRACTICE 
The literature provides extensive coverage of experiences with CBE in the past two decades. However, 
much of the material is descriptive, and even within the empirical literature there is a paucity of rigorous 
econometric studies. As we will argue, there are ample indications that the difficulties envisaged 
theoretically are indeed encountered in practice, and are amplified by practical implementation hurdles 
that are specific to CBE initiatives. The following section focuses on three cases of CBE, which represent 
different empirical examples of the approach. 
Three Examples of Community-Based Extension 
The first example of CBE is the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) program of Uganda, 
the first large-scale program in Africa that involved the contracting out of agricultural extension. The 
second example is the farmer field school (FFS) approach to extension services, which has been promoted 
in a large number of countries. FFS contains important elements of community-based extension, and the 
experiences with its implementation provide useful insights. The third example is the agricultural 
technology management agency (ATMA) model. The ATMA model is being implemented in India, and is 
one of the largest applications of decentralized CBE. Our discussion of the ATMA approach focuses on 
implementation cases that have been supported by the World Bank; other cases likely feature less 
community engagement (Raabe 2008). 
Uganda’s National Agricultural Advisory Services 
NAADS is a decentralized program that was initiated in 2001 in 24 subcounties of several districts of 
Uganda. With support from several donors, the program aimed to reach national coverage in 2008 
(Uganda, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry, and Fisheries 2007). As further discussed below, 
NAADS underwent some major changes in 2009. However, this paper refers to the NAADS structure that 
was in place prior to these changes since the available literature refers to this structure. In terms of Figure 
1, NAADS represents a far-reaching model of community participation, because farmers‘ organizations 
are involved in each step of the extension delivery chain (even though it is not clear to what extent they 
were involved in the reform process that led to the design of the NAADS program). The program is 
centrally guided but is implemented and administered in a decentralized manner, at least partially within 
the country‘s existing local government structures. A national board formulates strategic objectives, 
selects districts and subcounties to be included in the program (based on agreed criteria), defines key 
implementation procedures (such as procurement procedures, monitoring and reporting requirements), 
and provides technical services to local government levels of the program on issues that are beyond their 
capacity. The board is also responsible for certification, regulation, and overall quality verification of 
extension service providers (who may come from the private sector, NGOs, or semipublic organizations).  
In participating districts, the implementation of the program is overseen by a chief administrative 
officer supported by district councils. The councils, which include local politicians representing various 
stakeholders, officials, and farmers, oversee procurement boards. They were expected to also guide the 
process of converting local public extension workers into private advisory service providers (relatively 
little progress was achieved on this). Within each district, participating subcounties form a council 
(composed of local politicians, officials, and stakeholders) that is responsible for local-level strategy, 
liaising with districts, managing program funds, and involving farmers‘ forums (composed of 
representatives of farmers from groups of villages) in planning and setting guidelines (Uganda, Ministry 
of Agriculture, Animal Industry, and Fisheries and Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic 
Development 2001).  10 
Within the NAADS subcounties, farmer-participants (who make up only a fraction of the farming 
population) organize themselves in farmers‘ groups based on members‘ shared priorities and needs.
1 Each 
group elects two representatives to the subcounty farmers‘ forum, and it is at that level that priority 
technology needs are identified. The program manual requires that only three priorities be selected in each 
subcounty (NAADS 2004). Nominally, the forum, jointly with local officials, contracts and monitors 
service providers who deliver training and advice in the identified priority areas.  
Whereas the budget for the program at the local level is provided mostly through earmarked 
transfers from the national government (largely using targeted donor-supplied financing), those resources 
are to be complemented by an allocation from subcounty and district governments‘ regular budgets (5 
percent) as well as a nominal contribution (2 percent) from farmer-participants (Uganda, Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Industry, and Fisheries and Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic 
Development 2001).  
The Farmer Field School Approach 
The FFS approach to delivering information and educational services was designed originally as a means 
to introduce knowledge of integrated pest management (IPM) to irrigated rice farmers in Asia, but it has 
since been expanded to numerous countries, covering various agricultural themes (van den Berg and 
Jiggins 2007). A typical field school educates farmer participants on agro-ecosystems analysis as well as 
specific technological features of their crops and the field environment. In terms of Figure 1, FFS 
involves farmer participation in the stage of extension delivery where the extension agents interact with 
the farmers. However, extension agencies that use FFS may also involve farmers‘ groups in other stages 
of the extension delivery chain, such as financing.  
The FFS approach relies on participatory training methods to convey knowledge to field school 
participants, with the extension agent-trainer expected to act not just as a transmitter of information but 
mainly as a facilitator encouraging farmers‘ own discovery and discussion of their experiences and 
observations. A typical FFS entails a season-long sequence of half-day sessions of hands-on farmer 
experimentation and informal training to a selected group of 20–25 farmers during a single crop-growing 
season. The selection of participants into the training is done with strong community involvement through 
its established leadership and existing social structures. The participants are expected to contribute to the 
wider community through dissemination of knowledge and follow-up activities such as field experiments 
and collective actions. Initially, paid trainers or public extension staff lead the training. Through group 
interactions, attendees sharpen their decisionmaking abilities and are empowered by learning leadership, 
communication, and management skills (van de Fliert 1993). Some of the participating farmers may be 
selected to receive additional training to be qualified as farmer-trainers, who then take up training 
responsibilities (for some fee, possibly paid by their community) with official backup support such as 
training materials.  
India’s Agricultural Technology Management Agency Model 
The ATMA model of participatory decentralized extension was implemented originally as a pilot program 
in a World Bank–funded agricultural development project in India in the period 1998–2003. It has since 
been expanded to a national program funded by the Indian union government. The program operates at a 
district level (there are some 600 districts in the 28 states of India) and entails within each district a 
semiautonomous agency (referred to as an ATMA) dealing with extension matters. The agency can 
receive both public and private funds, as well as charge fees to clients. Each ATMA is directed and 
overseen by a governing board that includes representatives of all farmer classes in the district, as well as 
other stakeholders (private sector, rural banks, NGOs, official agencies dealing with agricultural 
development). The governing boards define strategic priorities reflecting the interests of the 
                                                       
1 In 2009, NAADS introduced a system of providing substantial amounts of funds to selected individual ―demonstration‖ 
farmers (see NAADS website < http://www.naads.or.ug/news.php?id=90>, accessed 03/03/10.)  11 
constituencies represented on the board. Within each village, farmers are also organized in self-help 
groups and other farmer interest groups, and these groups elect representatives into the block (subdistrict) 
farmer advisory committee (FAC).The chairs of the FACs serve on the ATMA governing board, which is 
led by the district collector (the most senior district government official). The ATMA director is a 
nonvoting member of the board. Block work programs are prepared by agricultural extension officials but 
need to be approved by block-level FACs before being sent to the ATMA governing board for review and 
approval. The FACs meet monthly to review progress in implementing the annual work plans and to 
suggest revisions. The design of the system thus provides, at least nominally, for ample farmer influence 
on extension activities, since every village is represented in the FAC (Swanson 2008). In terms of Figure 
1, the ATMA model involves farmers‘ organizations in all stages of the extension delivery chain, even 
though—unlike NAADS—it does not involve the contracting out of extension provision. 
With this background on the NAADS, FFS, and ATMA models, we can turn to a review of the 
limited evidence on performance of CBE approaches. Section 4.2 presents evidence from qualitative 
studies, and Section 4.3 reviews quantitative impact assessment studies. Both sections focus on the three 
models just described, but where evidence is available, they also refer to other cases. 
Evidence on the Performance of Community-Based Extension from Qualitative Studies 
This section reviews to what extent there is empirical evidence of the problems with CBE that were 
identified in Section 3 on a theoretical or conceptual basis.  
Exclusion and Elite Capture  
Insights on the risk of capture (which, as we noted earlier, is not unique to CBE) are derived from the 
experience of the NAADS program in Uganda. Several observers, cited in this paragraph, commented on 
a bias in implementation, leading to the favoring of wealthier farmers. Thus, one early study concluded 
that the mobilization of groups through local government leaders appealed to the progressive wealthier 
elite while ―the poorer sections of the population . . . were perceived to be excluded,‖ and that NAADS 
had ―a strong bias towards the better off‖ (Boesen, Miiro, and Kasozi 2004, 66). A study of the Mukono 
district reports that farmers perceive that ―poor farmers were left out‖ and suggests that the ―required 
relatively high levels of literacy and the lengthy debates (on prioritization) precluded women and the 
poor‖ (Obaa, Mutimba, and Semana 2005, 8–9). An OXFAM/FODOWE study cited by Kibwika (2006, 
101) reports on the basis of a 2004 survey that ―the only people who benefit from NAADS are those with 
convertible assets . . . or those with access to external financing such as remittances.‖ Similarly, 
Parkinson (2008) observes that by 2006, the program had ―introduced a number of short-term approaches 
that systematically rewarded wealthier and more connected farmers.‖ In support of this statement she 
provides data showing that NAADS group leadership comprises farmers of higher education and wealth 
status than that of regular members, concluding that ―poorer farmers . . . were less able to benefit from the 
types of technology NAADS provided‖ (164–165). Bukenya (2008) arrives at a similar conclusion. 
Farmer field school training programs have also been reported to be vulnerable to elite capture. In 
her study of the early phases of FFS training in Indonesia, van de Fliert (1993, 157) commented that ―the 
composition of the field school groups observed was not representative of the farmer population in the 
villages. The groups contained many village officials, and farmers with relatively high education, large 
(owned) fields, and off-farms jobs, and no women at all.‖ A later report on the Indonesian experience 
cites observations of a field operative complaining that the relegation of participant selection to the 
established village leadership resulted in preference for members of the village elite (Fakih, Rahardjo, and 
Pimbert 2003, 36). More generally, the report concluded that the FFS effort in Indonesia has not been 
characterized by equity in its coverage (64–65). Similarly, Feder and Savastano (2006) demonstrated 
econometrically in their analysis of Indonesian field school data that wealthier farmers with higher 
educational attainment had a higher probability of being selected for participation in the FFS training than 
others.  12 
A study of livestock field schools in Vietnam claims a necessity (in the context of that particular 
training theme) to skip the poorest segment of the community because of a perception that such people 
could not marshal the resources to raise even small livestock (Dalsgaard et al. 2005, 10). The study cites, 
however, evidence from livestock field schools in Bangladesh, Benin, and Senegal, where adherence to 
poverty- focused selection criteria yielded satisfactory levels of participation by the poor.  
The Decentralized Agricultural and Forestry Extension Project in Indonesia, whereby farmers‘ 
groups received grants to commission training and demonstration materials from public extension agents, 
reported only ―isolated‖ incidents of elite capture (World Bank 2005). However, it is observed that among 
the 16 reported village-level case studies‘ training activities, nine cases entailed training of groups 
amounting to less than 20 percent of the farming households (five cases involving less than 10 percent of 
farming households). Since the project did not include specific poverty-related selection criteria, it is not 
obvious that the poor received much representation in such small select groups.  
Difficulties in Implementing Farmers’ Priorities  
Uganda‘s NAADS program illustrates the practical difficulties of attempting to reflect farmers‘ priorities 
in the advice delivered by service providers, even within a nominally demand-driven CBE system. 
Several observers of the program (cited in this paragraph) suggested that farmers‘ actual control of 
priority setting for their groups‘ training is limited in reality (especially with the rather arbitrary 
restriction to only three commodities), undermining one of the key expected advantages of CBE systems. 
Obaa, Mutimba, and Semana (2005) describe the elements of the decision chain that leads to the design of 
a service contract by a provider within the NAADS program. Ultimately the priorities in the service 
contract are not defined for each group separately, but rather are determined at the subcounty level, and 
consequently the content of the training reflects an aggregate demand of many groups as well as top-down 
priorities of the national and local government (emphasis on commercial crops). The training received by 
any group may therefore contain only some or none of the priorities expressed by that specific group. 
Indeed, Obaa, Mutimba, and Semana report cases where farmers were actually getting advice on 
enterprises that were not their priority. Similarly, a study in one NAADS district (Friis-Hansen 2004) 
reports participants‘ frustration with the length of time consumed by various layers of the enterprise 
prioritization process, noting that ―the enterprises on which they receive advisory services only rarely 
[are] similar to those for which they articulated needs‖ (9), partly because of NAADS‘s emphasis on 
commercial crops that are often not farmers‘ first priority. Frustration with the priority-setting process is 
reported to have led to high participant dropout rates (Parkinson 2008). The practical difficulty seems to 
stem from the high administrative transaction cost of establishing a financing and procurement system 
that can transfer funds down to a community (single-farmer-group) level and enable direct contracting of 
services by a single farmer group. In addition, such a system faces a challenge in monitoring the uses of 
funds and is prone to elite capture and corruption even at the community level, as discussed by Platteau 
and Abraham (2002) and Deininger and Liu (2008). In Chile and Costa Rica, the government attempted to 
reduce the transaction cost of making funds for contracting extension available directly to farmers through 
the distribution of vouchers. The farmer-holders of vouchers could use them to pay qualified extension 
service providers. As farmers made their payment directly to the service provider, it was expected that 
their priorities would be fully addressed by the extension agent. However, the institutional arrangements 
required to monitor and control the use of the vouchers so as to prevent fraud were inadequate, leading to 
major abuses and reduced effectiveness (Dinar 1996; Berdegué and Marchant 2002; Cox and Ortega 
2004; Bebbington and Sotomayor 1998). Evidently, an appropriate control system needs to be 
significantly more extensive and hence more expensive.  
Difficulties in Implementing Farmers’ Control of Service Providers’ Contracts 
As argued in Section 3, effective control of service providers‘ contracts by the community is critical to 
generate incentives for high-quality service delivery. Again the NAADS system in Uganda illustrates the 
practical difficulties in translating this principle into reality. As noted, contracts within NAADS are 13 
awarded by the subcounty administration because no mechanism exists to transfer funds down to a village 
community level. Farmer group members themselves do not monitor the performance of service 
providers; instead, that responsibility is given to the farmers‘ forum that represents farmer groups from 
the entire subcounty. The existence of a wedge between the actual service recipients and the issuers and 
enforcers of the contracts weakens providers‘ accountability to the farmers who receive advice, and thus 
diminishes the incentives to provide high-quality service. Even the monitoring by representatives of the 
farmers‘ forum is deficient: farmers entrusted with this task are supposed to receive compensation for the 
time and effort exerted in monitoring on behalf of the larger community. However, funds to pay them are 
often not available, reducing the incentive to perform a role that only marginally serves their own farming 
group (Muwonge 2007). Evidently, the farming population of a subcounty is not perceived as a 
community in a social sense, and thus it does not possess the social capital that would facilitate and 
induce voluntary (unpaid) actions on behalf of the group. As Hayami (2009, 111) argues, ―For the 
community to have sufficient social relation capital in organizing cooperation among its members, its 
membership must be small enough to ensure intense social interactions.‖  
Limited Availability of Competent Service Providers  
The advantages of CBE (and more generally all demand-driven extension systems) are predicated on the 
availability of a cadre of skilled service providers who can compete for the extension contracts that 
communities issue. Those providers who do not perform satisfactorily would then be weeded out by the 
competitive market process. Centralized screening and accreditation mechanisms can be introduced to 
limit the ability of unqualified service providers to take advantage of farmers‘ lack of familiarity with the 
true capacity of a bidder in the initial phase of a CBE program. However, in many developing countries 
there is a rather thin market of qualified service providers, and the situation is exacerbated by the 
vulnerability of the accreditation mechanism to corruption and political manipulation. In some more-
developed countries (for example, the United Kingdom and New Zealand), the privatization and 
dismantling of public extension systems released into the market for extension service provision large 
numbers of competent would-be advisers. In contrast, the skills of extension staff in many developing 
countries were built on a slender educational preparation and were geared toward generic technology 
messages, rather than the more specific and localized issues that farmers tend to identify as their 
priorities. A transitional period whereby potential service providers equip themselves (through training 
and recruitment) with the skills that are likely to be demanded would need to be taken in account. 
However, that generates an incentive problem, as it is unlikely that potential providers would heavily 
invest their own resources in training staff prior to actual identification of demand and assurance of 
landing contracts. This induced Chapman and Tripp (2003, 7) to perceive a public-sector role in 
organizing and funding training in the transitional phase. The issue is even more acute when the 
dismantling of the public extension system is held up by political or administrative obstacles. This is 
illustrated by the experience in Uganda, where the retrenchment of the public extension system that was 
planned to run in parallel with the implementation of the CBE seemingly did not materialize due to legal 
issues. Cadres of the public extension service providers were therefore mostly not available to compete 
for the provision of services, and various NGOs, private groups, and semipublic entities, of varying 
backgrounds and records, gained contracts. Procedures for providers‘ qualification and accreditation 
could be implemented only with delay and were fraught with irregularities, and the training and skills 
updating (funded in part by the NAADS program) were not systematically carried out. The inadequacy of 
service providers and the resultant low quality of service were highlighted in the NAADS midterm review 
(Kazigati 2005, 45; Nyanzi 2005, 46). Similarly, Ekwamu and Brown (2005, 28) reported that ―the 
quality of service provision emerged as a major issue in personal interviews with farmer groups.‖ 
Deficiencies and irregularities in the procedures for procuring service provision are claimed to have led to 
the award of contracts to providers who lacked qualifications and who consequently delivered low-quality 
service (Parkinson 2008, 139–140). Based on field interviews, Muwonge (2007) raised concerns 
regarding service quality, which he attributed to deficient monitoring of provider performance. 14 
Newspaper reports also point to wide-spread corruption problems in procurement contracts under 
NAADS (New Vision 2010). In 2009, the Ugandan government announced the reintroduction of the 
public extension service as the main extension provider in the NAADS program.  
Problems of inadequate availability of qualified service providers also afflicted the voucher-based 
extension programs in Chile and Costa Rica in the early 1990s (Ameur 1994; Bebbington and Sotomayor 
1998). China‘s program, whereby farmer associations contract technical services from public entities such 
as research institutes, universities, and individual scientists, was also assessed to have suffered due to the 
limited access to subject matter specialists (Kidd et al. 2000). The current scaling-up phase of the ATMA 
program in India is claimed to be adversely affected by limited capacity of existing personnel and the 
inadequate skills of extension agents inherited from the long-defunct Training and Visit (T&V) extension 
system (Sulaiman and Hall 2008; Swanson 2009). 
Changing the Attitudes and the Top-Down Orientation of Extension Organizations 
Most CBE programs maintain a dependence on public-sector organizations (whether at the local or 
national level, or both), and they are introduced with the encouragement and initial funding of external 
donors. The long-term effectiveness and sustainability of such reforms depend crucially on the extent to 
which government bureaucracies and field-level workers can adopt the participatory mode of operation 
that underlies CBE. The pilot phase of the Indian ATMA model illustrated that a formal structure of 
governance that deliberately engages beneficiaries, and appropriate training of extension personnel, can 
indeed flourish in what is traditionally a top-down field of extension endeavor in that nation. According to 
Swanson (2008), the farmer-orientation of the ATMA model in India positively affected the motivation 
and morale of the field extension staff: ―For the first time, they could see the direct impact of their work 
on the lives of farmers, farm women and rural young people within their block and district. This new 
arrangement had a direct and positive impact on their performance. In the process, they were transformed 
from merely transferring technology (for example, delivering information) to becoming problem solvers 
in working with farmer groups to identify and help solve specific problems or needs in pursuing different 
enterprises‖ (32). However, Swanson (2009) points out that when the program moved to a national scale, 
funds for appropriate training of extension staff in the concepts and methods of participatory processes 
were not provided, resulting in disappointing performance. Similarly, Sulaiman and Hall (2008, 3) refer to 
―attitudinal barriers at all levels‖ and ―lack of local ownership‖ as two of the factors underlying their 
concern that ATMA will suffer the same fate as the failed T&V extension system. 
Given that most extension officials have been brought up in a top-down organizational culture 
where farmers are viewed as wards of the state, it is not surprising that change is difficult and reversals 
occur. In the Ugandan NAADS system, local governments do not fully ―own‖ the community-based 
approach, even though it has some strong champions at the national level (Muwonge 2007). This is 
reflected in foot-dragging on local complementary budget allocations, and in the assertion of de facto 
control of contracting by officials at the subcounty level, even though the farmers‘ forums were supposed 
to have much influence over that responsibility. The emphasis on commercial crops that reflects the 
agricultural development strategy of the national government often takes precedence in selecting training 
programs over expressed priority needs of farmers‘ groups (Bahiigwa, Rigby, and Woodhouse 2005). In 
Indonesia, a review of two decades of FFSs concluded that although many field-workers subscribe to the 
participatory principles of the community based approach, ―there is little evidence that the culture and 
practice of participation in Community IPM has fundamentally influenced government bureaucracies. 
Overall, the FAO-Government programme on Community IPM has had little enduring effect at higher 
levels of the bureaucracy. Relatively more progress and change have occurred at the provincial and 
district government levels. . . . In broad terms, lack of real change in organisational culture, structures and 
procedures were the main obstacles for the uptake and institutionalisation of Community IPM in the 
bureaucracy‖ (Fakih, Rahardjo, and Pimbert 2003, 45–46).  
Observers of the experience of the decentralized extension project completed in Indonesia in 
2005 highlighted the limited comprehension by local-level staff of the CBE concept, and perceived that a 15 
couple of staff-training workshops over a period of a few months would not suffice to change a mind-set 
developed over years of top-down interaction with farmers (Bourgeois and Kusumaningrum 2006, 77). 
This is reflected by the ineffectiveness of a key local institution—the district extension committee, or 
DEC—which the project created as a stakeholders‘ forum (including, in particular, farmer 
representatives) to provide strategic guidance and define extension priorities. As the authors of a project 
completion report noted, ―most DECs remain dominated by government through an over-representation 
(usually 50 percent or more) or perceived authority of government members‖ (World Bank 2005a, 8). 
In Vietnam, the introduction of participatory extension through a livestock field school program 
faced significant difficulties because of ―a strong inclination towards applying the familiar (and thus 
comfortable) style of top-down instruction‖ (Dalsgaard et al. 2005, 5). The external donors (who were 
promoting a CBE concept) had to compromise and accept a system that retains a distinct flavor of 
traditional top-down technocratic extension development, because ―too much ‗participatory arm twisting‘ 
by external advisors was not welcome‖ (Dalsgaard et al. 2005, 6). More generally, after almost two 
decades of experimentation with FFS approaches in various crops in Vietnam (invariably with external 
donor funding), the field school model has not yet been widely mainstreamed into the agricultural 
extension system of Vietnam (van de Fliert et al. 2007).  
Evidence on the Impact of Community-Based Extension from Quantitative Studies  
There have been several quantitative analyses of the impacts of CBE programs. A number of these studies 
deal with small-scale pilot programs or with a limited geographical area within a national program. It is 
therefore difficult to ascertain to what extent their results would hold for a large-scale program, or 
whether they are representative of a national program. Studies of CBE are also subject to the typical 
methodological and data challenges that make the evaluation of extension impact difficult (Birkhaeuser, 
Evenson, and Feder 1991).  
A study of two pilot programs in Nicaragua (Dinar and Keynan 2001) used secondary data to 
calculate incremental farm-level net revenue margins for one program and benefit–cost ratios for the other 
program. Both programs arranged for service contracts between public (in the case of the first program) 
or private (in the case of the second program) service providers and farmers, with a substantial public 
subsidy. Gross margins varied among the four regions in the first program, and the aggregate gain, while 
positive, was not considered robust. Moreover, the calculation did not account for government 
expenditures and did not allow statistical testing. The analysis of the second program suggested a high 
benefit–cost ratio (1.77), but it did not account for all the public costs and was not subjected to statistical 
testing.  
A Honduran small-scale public program to provide privately contracted extension services to 
groups of farmers has been evaluated by Hanson, Just, and Lainez (2006). Similar to the NAADS 
program, the service provider contracts are not drawn directly between the farmer group and the provider, 
but in the Honduran case representatives of each group were interviewed at the end of the season by 
program officials to assess client satisfaction. The overall rates of return on operations in two 
geographical areas were 8 percent and 10 percent, with a number of arbitrary assumptions on the profile 
of benefits over time. It is not clear whether the overhead costs of the program administration were 
included in the calculation.  
Farmer field school programs have been the focus of quite a few empirical studies (Feder, 
Murgai, and Quizon 2004a, 2004b; Godtland et al. 2004; Tripp, Wijeratne, and Piyadasa 2005; Ricker-
Gilbert et al. 2008), and extensive literature reviews citing such studies are available in Davis (2006) and 
van den Berg and Jiggins (2007). The studies are too numerous to review here, but our conclusion is that 
the results are mixed. Some of the positive results claimed are based on inadequate econometric analysis 
that does not properly account for selection biases. Insufficient attention is given to the full cost of the 
training, which tends to be higher (per farmer) than less-intensive extension methods. It has also been 
noted that diffusion of information between trained farmers and other members of the community is 
problematic due to the detailed and experiential nature of the training, as highlighted by Braun et al. 16 
(2006, 39): ―This [limited diffusion] leaves open the question how the beneficial impact of FFS on 
participating farmers can be scaled up beyond the relatively small numbers that can be reached directly 
through FFS. . . . The experience so far is that too many key characteristics of the FFS erode during mass 
replication for the benefits to be sustained.‖  
The NAADS program in Uganda, being one of the largest national CBE programs, has been 
studied by many, although only two studies undertook a rigorous econometric analysis based on a 
sufficiently large sample. A study by Benin et al. (2007) relying on a 2004 survey of 894 households 
suggests that the program had a significant and positive impact on the adoption of new crop and livestock 
enterprises (vanilla, groundnut, goats, bees), modern technology, and postharvest technologies. However, 
the results do not indicate significant differences between NAADS and non-NAADS subcounties in crop 
yields or total (crop and livestock) income, although they suggest that farmers in NAADS subcounties 
avoided some of the large drops in crop income experienced by those in non-NAADS subcounties. A 
serious limitation on the robustness of the result is that the study does not systematically account for the 
possible selection bias whereby the subcounties covered by NAADS are different from those not selected 
for inclusion in the program. Another drawback is the estimation of income and consumption changes on 
the basis of respondents‘ recall over a five-year horizon.  
Another study of NAADS impact, based on a more limited sample of households interviewed in 
2005–2006, attempts to tackle selection bias through an instrumental variable procedure (Muwonge 
2007). In one of the specifications (that actually relies on ordinary least squares regression), the study 
estimates that NAADS participation increased the value of farm production by 18 percent, but the result 
may not be robust as it is statistically significant only at the 90 percent confidence level. It is noteworthy 
that once instrumental variables are used, extension impact is not significant. The author rejects the 
instrumental variables specification on the grounds that there is no indication of an endogeneity problem, 
but this conclusion is most likely due to the choice of weak instrumental variables (none of which is at the 
household level).  
A study conducted at the pilot phase of the ATMA program in 28 project districts suggested that 
the reformed extension system contributed to increasing farm income and rural employment through 
agricultural diversification. During a four-year period (1999−2003), the horticultural cropping area 
increased from 12 to 16 percent; oilseed crop area increased from 3 to 11 percent; and the crop area for 
herbs, medicinal, and aromatic crops increased from 1 to 5 percent. During this period, the area planted to 
cereal crops (primarily wheat and rice) declined from 55 to 47 percent, but yields increased 14 percent, 
resulting in no appreciable loss in the production of staple food crops. During this period, average farm 
income across the 28 pilot project districts increased 24 percent, in contrast with only 5 percent in 
nonproject districts (Tyagi and Verma 2004). The analysis may have inadequately tackled selection biases 
and baseline advantages of some of the program districts, and thus the attributions may entail an 
overestimate. The scaled-up program that expanded the ATMA model to the national level has not been 
evaluated rigorously, but it is perceived to be floundering: Sulaiman and Hall (2008) attribute the 
difficulties to numerous implementation challenges, including insufficient support; mismatch with 
diversity of application contexts; lack of local ownership; and capacity and institutional constraints. 
Swanson (2009) agrees with the assessment of the poor status of the national program, but argues that the 
key problem is insufficient resources to invest in training extension staff in the Indian states in 
participatory methods.  
A study of the impact of the Indonesia Decentralized Agricultural and Forestry Extension uses a 
panel sample of program participants and nonparticipants to infer impact on income and other 
performance criteria (Bourgeois and Kusumaningrum 2006). The study, which is afflicted by a number of 
data and methodological issues, produced numerous mixed results, and curiously it indicated no project 
impact on agricultural incomes but some impact on nonfarm income. The results are summarized by one 
of the authors as follows: ―There is no clear indication that the Participatory Action and People 
Participation method directly . . . improved the welfare of rural people. Field research indicated that 
provision of inputs and services to target groups was not constant over the project‘s time frame (five 
years). But still the project provided some benefits for the farmers, including better knowledge in how to 17 
acquire resources; learning how to make proposals and how to discuss and decide together about 
priorities‖ (Kusumaningrum 2007, 1).  
The few cases reviewed here serve to highlight the need for cogent quantitative analysis of 
extension schemes of different types but especially CBE variants.  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
The belief that farmers can use improved information to advance their productivity and profitability as 
well as contribute to higher rates of agricultural and economic growth and poverty reduction is widely 
held and has been a key rationale for agricultural extension being an important element of agricultural 
development strategy for decades. But the validity of this belief has come under increasing scrutiny in 
recent years as evidence of less than satisfactory experience has been accumulating in the developing 
world as well as among the agencies that are engaged in assisting national efforts.  
We began our review by examining the conceptual underpinnings of community-based extension 
approaches, whereby users of agricultural extension services are empowered, usually through their 
community structures such as farmers‘ associations (of varying degree of formality of constitution) or 
other associations that bring people together over shared interests, to influence what is attempted and how 
it is achieved in such service systems. The organizational structures represent vehicles for bringing social 
capital and engaged linkage to help in the delivery of information and other services that can be provided 
through advisory endeavor. The key rationale in pursuing such approaches is to overcome the theoretical 
and practical challenges inherent in the design of traditional public extension models, typically conducted 
by agencies located within a ministry of agriculture. The essence of the community-based, or demand-
driven, approaches is to make extension workers accountable to the users of the services, and to enable 
beneficiaries to articulate well their needs and get them attended to by extension providers and more 
directly to be aware of and reactive to the effectiveness of delivery. Since user beneficiaries may not be 
fully conscious of the opportunities available, there is an element of faith or hope (bolstered by 
appropriate institutional design and implementation) that the providers will indeed be able to deliver 
cogent information in timely and effective manners.  
In light of Hayami‘s (2009) insights on community failures, it should come as no surprise that the 
reality of recent experience with CBE approaches to delivery of agricultural advisory services, as 
reviewed in the final section, finds them to be somewhat lacking in terms of having successfully 
overcome all the problematic features of extension delivery in the past. In the unfortunately rather few 
cases where performance has been relatively carefully studied, we find that elite capture constitutes a 
major constraint. The experience has not been much better in having the empowered farmer beneficiaries 
be successful in setting the extension agenda and ―supervising‖ delivery of desired services. For instance, 
articulating farmers‘ priorities and getting them into extension work programs was a central design 
feature of NAADS in Uganda, but that was seriously compromised in implementation both because of 
influences that might be called political and because of bureaucratic constraints on devolving authority to 
the village-based farmer group. The experience with the pilot phase of the ATMA model in India in this 
respect may have been better, perhaps because of the greater number of checks and balances incorporated 
in the arrangements for ATMA governance combined with proper training of staff involved. The 
disappointing experience of the same model at the scaled-up phase points out that the conclusions derived 
from a relatively small (in the Indian context) pilot cannot be simply extrapolated. 
A related aspect of farmer empowerment is in implementing farmers‘ control of service 
providers‘ contracts. This is evidently an aspect that requires considerable administrative imagination and 
novel mechanisms that have as yet not been forged effectively, given the experience overviewed in 
Section 4. Part of the challenge for CBE derives from the problem, often encountered in developing 
countries, of a chronic shortage of competent potential service providers. The important role for public 
investment here is largely one of providing resources and mechanisms for training cadres of extension 
workers with relevant skill mixes, not an easy thing to do with the educational facilities available in many 
countries.  
Altruism extends only so far in service delivery of any sort. With the frequently experienced 
problems of timely availability of adequate funds to support CBE activities as desired and demanded by 
community or farmers‘ groups, there have been many frustrations in the studied CBE endeavors. Such 
difficulties have plagued the traditional publicly delivered extension services of recent decades, but to the 19 
extent that CBE is dependent on such flows of public resources, especially those coming down from 
national budgets, these realities are just as damaging, in terms of efficient public spending, for CBE-type 
delivery systems.  
Top-down thinking is hard to shake off by those accustomed to its lures, or so it seems in the 
cases studied. Deep-seated cultural attitudes are surely important features of the challenge of effectively 
empowering farmers and changing mind-sets of extension workers ostensibly working on their behalf. To 
summarize these various challenges reviewed in this chapter, CBE, in spite of its promise, is no panacea. 
There are important knowledge gaps yet to be filled, as transpires from our review of the limited 
econometric evidence, to inform the public debate on investment in agricultural extension. Thus, we 
conclude our review with the inevitable academic call for further research in this surely important area of 
investment for agricultural and economic development. Yujiro Hayami‘s work on social capital and 
communities can guide this field of research as it provides an insightful perspective for analyzing the 
potentials and limitations of the community mechanism in agricultural development—limitations that 
must be recognized more realistically, and potentials that must be exploited more creatively! 
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